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Abstract 
Research question: The severity and immediacy of funding cuts to National Governing 
Bodies of Sport, driven by the No Compromise’ policy framework, routinely plunges 
organisations into a phase of turnaround management. The requirement for adept strategies 
during these times of considerable challenge is glaring, yet literature investigating turnaround 
within an NGB context remains limited. Consequently, this paper examines “how dramatic 
and immediate reductions in funding impact upon the ability of NGBs to meet future 
performance targets?”   
Research methods: A case study methodology was used to provide an in-depth insight into 
how three such NGBs responded, over a twelve month period through a phase of turnaround. 
This was informed by 24 semi structured interviews with Chief Executives/Presidents, 
Performance Managers/Head Coaches, Elite Athletes and UK Sport representatives. 
Results and findings: The results highlight that NGBs turnaround strategies and actions 
were constrained considerably by extreme funding dependency and prohibitive institutional 
contexts within which they exist. This context triggered an overwhelmingly operational and 
short term oriented approach, akin to a state of flux. The upshot being a series of measures 
that destabilise future success and undermine the stakeholder relationships. 
Implications: An endemic feature of the ‘No Compromise’ framework is severe funding 
cuts, this should therefore be a significant consideration in the strategy development of 
NGBs. The evidenced of this study is that they don’t sufficiently prepare, or react, 
strategically to this reality and consequently their turnaround management is flawed. This 
raises a significant discussion for both the management of NGBs and academic research 
informing it.  
Keywords: Turnaround; No Compromise; retrenchment; reorganisation; repositioning 
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Introduction 
The management and governance of high-performance sport is shaped by, and 
entwined with, government policy. Medal successes, for UK athletes, have been pivotal in 
both legitimising continued political support for elite sport (Sam, 2009) and also validating 
the ‘No Compromise’ policy framework. In December 2012, UK Sport - the body responsible 
for funding elite sport - allocated £274.5m for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janerio. 
UK Sport targets “resources solely at those athletes/sports that are capable of delivering 
medal-winning performances” (UK Sport, 2006, p. 1). While seventeen Olympic sports saw 
generous increases in funding ten National Governing Bodies of Sport (NGBs) saw their 
allocations cut. The most extreme examples were Archery, Basketball, Handball, Table 
Tennis, Volleyball, Weightlifting, and Wrestling whose funding was reduced by in excess of 
30%. 
Given the recurrent nature of funding cuts the response of NGBs is worthy of 
investigation, yet relatively few studies have been conducted (Green, 2006; Houlihan & 
Green, 2009). In this paper, we therefore ask the question “how do dramatic and immediate 
reductions in funding impact upon the ability of NGBs to meet future performance targets?” 
Specifically, we explore evidence that sudden resource depletion undermines – and can 
cripple - sport development pathways needed by elite athletes to attain Olympic success 
(Veerle De Bosscher, De Knop, van Bottenburg, & Shibli, 2006). 
There exists a growing resource dependency of NGBs on UK Sport (Boyne, 2004; 
Slack & Hinings, 1992; UK Sport, 2014; UK Sport, 2015a). This underpins the need for 
NGBs to deliver “immediate and quantifiable outcomes” to, at times of cuts, re-engage with 
UK Sport (Bredgaard & Larsen, 2007, p. 293). Overwhelming focus upon achieving short-
term performance can diminish longer-term approaches which may identify, and lead to 
measures to alleviate or rectify, the sources of decline (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006; Pandey, 
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2010). Any inclination toward short-term operational emphasis has the potential to undermine 
the long-term stability of organisations and their enduring stakeholder relationships (Barker 
& Duhaime, 1997; Boyne, 2003; Verbeeten, 2008). Decisions, in times of turnaround and 
resource depletion, are crucial in order to keep key stakeholders engaged (David, 2013; 
Walshe, Harvey, Hyde, & Pandit, 2004). Sudden realignment of objectives may be 
inconsistent with the expectations of internal stakeholders who consider these actions short-
term, and failing to address the real causes of decline (Derry, 2012; Mano, 2010; Trahms, 
Ndofor, & Sirmon, 2013). This conundrum is recognised by Raisch & Schmitt (Raisch & 
Schmitt, 2013, p. 1223) who explains that “performing tensions thus emerge in turnarounds 
through competing objectives focused on either short-term (efficiency) or long-term 
(effectiveness) performance.” NGBs require timely and insightful strategy to cope when they 
have no alternative but to undertake major actions to ensure organisation survival (Boyne & 
Walker, 2004; Boyne & Walker, 2004; Hofer, 1980; Pretorius, 2008).  
Although considerable research has been conducted on change management within 
sport organisations (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2002; Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004; Skille, 
2011; Slack & Hinings, 1992; Thibault, Hinings, & Slack, 1991) it has typically ignored the 
distinctive context in which the change takes place (Frisby, 2005). This is significant, in the 
case of NGBs, as they are highly constrained by a resource dependency relationship that has 
been defined as fragile and insecure (Green & Houlihan, 2006; Green, 2006; Green, 2008). 
Change management solutions are thus complicated and misunderstood due to the 
contingencies and complex responsibilities affecting NGBs, consequently this paper 
identifies and takes account of the institutional and environmental pressures specific to NGBs 
(Amis & Silk, 2005; Di Maggio & Powell, 1983). Through in-depth interviews, phased over a 
twelve month period, with 24 chief executives, performance managers and athletes in three 
‘failing’ NGBs, we explore and explain the turnaround strategies they employed and evaluate 
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consequences. By conducting a series of in depth interviews with key individuals, at the heart 
of the NGB turnarounds, this paper contributes to knowledge by offering a thick description 
of NGBs in a turnaround situation (Geertz, 1994; Nightingale & Cromby, 2002). 
The paper begins with a comprehensive review of literature to set out a theoretical 
framework for turnaround management in NGBs, specifically examining their unique 
circumstances and inhibitors. This is followed by an outline of our methodology before 
presenting results and discussion that highlights the response of NGBs and implications for 
their future success and stakeholders. The paper concludes with discussion of how 
widespread reductions in funding provide a perennial challenge to NGBs and that the evident 
status quo is inconsistent with the future success of High Performance Sport and therefore 
change is required. 
Literature Review 
The concept of turnaround 
Given that funding for elite sports received by NGBs is now insecure, fragile and 
transient in nature (Green & Houlihan, 2005; Green & Houlihan, 2006), we expected to find 
research that investigates turnaround management and change within NGBs. We did not. 
Moreover, we found few empirical studies that examine turnaround within a public sector 
context, despite cuts being commonplace (Boyne, 2006; Jas & Skelcher, 2005; Paton & 
Mordaunt, 2004). Nevertheless this limited research holds salience for the study of NGBs 
(Boyne, 2004) who are government-funded organisations and have the characteristics of 
‘publicness’ (Pandey, 2010), characterised by resource dependent relationships with funding 
agencies. An NGB fits this description as it is “now accountable upwards, to Sport England 
and UK Sport, and no longer downwards to its stakeholders” (Grix & Phillpots, 2011, p. 11).  
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Due to high levels of publicness, turnaround processes within NGBs may require 
complex service delivery changes, the achievement of multifaceted objectives, and 
interaction with multiple stakeholder groups (Amis et al., 2002; Mongkol, 2011; Pandey, 
2010; Singh, 2003; Spear, 2004). In the face of these challenges, the question arises as to 
whether such public organisations possess the flexibility needed effectually turnaround, or 
become prone to long-term, even permanent, ‘failure’ (Andrews, Boyne, & Enticott, 2006; 
Boyne, 2006). To avoid this ‘spiral of decline’, NGBs will have to establish new patterns of 
behaviour that challenge the previous strategies and management practices that fall short of 
UK Sport targets (Sull, 2005). Therefore, Grinyer et al. (1990, pp. 130-131) explains the 
turnaround context faced by the NGBs when stating: 
A turnaround situation is when there is no alternative [danger to survival] but 
for the firm to take major measures to alter the long-run potential of the 
company. 
 
Where there are sudden funding reductions, the turnaround challenge faced by NGBs 
is acute, not one of gradual decline. Consequently, it becomes extremely difficult to plan 
or/and trigger a turnaround (Walshe et al., 2004). Boyne (2004), through his conceptual 
framework of retrenchment, reorganisation and repositioning (3Rs), has established a link 
between turnaround strategies in the private sector and their application to public 
organisations. His research is supported by others who argue that organisations are more 
likely to turnaround if they employ a combination of retrenchment, reorganisation and 
repositioning strategies (Beeri, 2009; Boyne, 2004; Boyne, 2006; Boyne, Walker, Andrews, 
& Law, 2009; Brewster, 2004; Trahms et al., 2013; Walshe et al., 2004). The turnaround 
approaches have been applied to failing schools and local authorities, and therefore we 
believe they have value for studying other types of organisation with high levels of 
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publicness (Beeri, 2009; Favero & Rutherford, 2015; Murphy, 2006). In the next three 
subsections, we describe each of the 3Rs in more detail. 
Retrenchment 
The strategy of retrenchment would see the NGBs reaction to funding reductions 
through the lens of "turning the organisation into one that is smaller, doing less, consuming 
fewer resources, but still doing something and doing it well” (Behn, 1980, p. 614; Boyne, 
2004). In essence, the organisation is seeking to put in place long-term strategies that seek to 
reduce overall size and scope through cost cutting that calibrates expenditure so that it does 
not exceed future income (Boyne, 2006). However, Boyne (2006, p. 376) goes on to explain 
that no research has investigated whether “deep retrenchment undermines the viability of a 
concurrent or subsequent repositioning or recovery strategy.”  To date, the working 
assumption is that retrenchment does not have a negative impact on recovery, and at worst 
will be neutral (Boyne, 2006). While such studies express doubts on the utility of the 
retrenchment concept within the public sector, Boyne & Meier provide a coherent assessment 
of its benefit when organisations - like NGBs – lose a significant proportion of their 
government funding: 
Periodic fiscal crises in the public sector have shown that various forms of 
retrenchment can be undertaken, for example, shedding staff, replacing direct 
service provision with contracts for external supply, and seeking efficiency 
gains. (Boyne & Meier, 2009a, p. 843) 
 
One of the central issues surrounding the strategy of retrenchment is that it is difficult 
to determine exactly how deep the retrenchment exercise should go, particularly if the 
organisation is unsure what resources will be needed to enact a recovery (Arogyaswamy, 
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Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1995). For example, retrenchment could be used to reduce non-
core staff levels so as to re-align the organisation’s focus on core services by up-skilling 
remaining staff (Boyne & Meier, 2009a). Green (2007) found that NGBs target non-core 
professional staff first when faced with funding reductions to safeguard the sports 
infrastructure. Core services are maintained even if retrenchment induces identity dissonance 
and there is a draining away of talented, competent and skilled professional staff who could 
play key roles in a turnaround effort (Jeyavelu, 2009; Rosenblatt & Sheaffer, 2001). While 
we foresee a possibility that retrenchment may perpetuate decline, many authors argue that an 
NGB can align resources to the core staff and support strategic retrenchment of the NGB and 
improve organisational efficiency (Bozeman, 2010; Rasheed, 2005; Thibault & Babiak, 
2005). If retrenchment is successful, it increases the resources available for reorganisation, 
however, Boyne (2006, p. 382) hints at the need for caution when organisations with high 
levels of publicness employ a retrenchment strategy: 
Although retrenchment is technically and politically feasible in the public 
sector, it is likely to comprise a more limited set of sub-strategies than in the 
private sector. Whether this also implies a more limited impact on recovery 
remains to be investigated.   
Reorganisation 
Reorganisation refers to changes in the internal structure and management of an 
organisation, with Boyne (2004) arguing this to be a viable option for NGBs to bring about 
performance improvements in a turnaround strategy (Boyne, 2004). This process can involve 
alterations in the organisation’s structure, centralisation/decenralisation actions, changes to 
planning systems or senior management (Beeri, 2009; Boyne, 2004; Favero & Rutherford, 
2015; Raisch & Schmitt, 2013). While it is logical that an organisation in turnaround will 
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alter structures to utilise resources most effectively, Boyne (2006) notes that further research 
is needed to examine how reorganisation interacts with other turnaround strategies, and 
whether it is better to reorganise, retrench and reposition at the same time, or isolate each 
process in order to attend to them separately.  
Reorganisation can trigger changes that create additional pressures at a time when 
limited resources are already in decline (Favero & Rutherford, 2015). If we see NGBs as 
policy implementers, then we need to bear in that research suggests public sector 
organisations cannot achieve goals, including reorganisation, without adequate resources 
(Boyne, 2003; Boyne, 2004). For example, Fernandez & Rainey (2006) note that resource 
scarcity will not only hamper turnaround efforts but also lead to neglect of core functions and 
trigger high levels of interpersonal stress. Such changes can potentially cause anxiety, 
powerlessness, and apathy towards the organisation by key stakeholders, decreasing 
satisfaction levels and increasing the possibility of workers exercising rights to exit (Dowding 
& John, 2008; Forster, 2006). If the organisation adopts a reorganisation strategy, widespread 
participation in the change process is needed from stakeholders to disseminate information, 
explain the need for change, allay resistance and promote sufficient tolerance that 
repositioning becomes possible (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006; McAdam & Donaghy, 1999). 
Repositioning 
Repositioning seeks to update the mission and goals of the organisation through 
entrepreneurial strategies that emphasise growth and innovation (Hofer, 1980). It 
complements retrenchment and reorganisation approaches and represents proactive measures 
that will lead to recovery (Beeri, 2012). An initial examination of actions available to NGBs - 
relative to private sector counterparts - might conclude that repositioning strategies are 
limited because the “most radical forms of repositioning (moving into new industries and 
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geographical markets) are unavailable” (Boyne & Meier, 2009b, p. 844). However, research 
by Rutherford & Favero (2015) established that stakeholders see repositioning more 
positively than retrenchment and therefore, such strategies may secure greater legitimacy 
with stakeholders if they are focused on the core processes of the organisation (Beeri, 2012; 
Hofer, 1980; Trahms et al., 2013). 
Repositioning can be particularly threatening to volunteer networks within NGBs due 
to a perception that it will compromise the dominant values, culture and ideology of the sport 
(Amis et al., 2002; Grix, 2009; Sherry, Shilbury, & Wood, 2007; Smith, 2004; Steen-Johnsen 
& Hanstad, 2008). Sport organisations will have their “set of collective beliefs and 
expectations, which bind [it] to its history and traditional operational practices” (Smith, 2004, 
p. 75). Consequently, effective communications may be needed to dispel such perceptions, 
re-engage stakeholders, and stimulate a more participatory environment and build trust in the 
changes that the NGB believes will benefit the sport (Arnstein, 1969; Minogue, 2000; Spear, 
2004). Without addressing the values and culture of the NGB, repositioning may not be 
successful because the changes will not be sustained due to internal challenges and 
dissonance (Amis et al., 2002). 
Repositioning is a viable strategy for NGBs to adopt, however, there are several 
issues that can limit acceptance, particularly within the context of public sector organisations 
(Boyne, 2006). Firstly, its application is limited where NGBs are faced with extensive 
resource shortages and a prolonged period of retrenchment (Favero & Rutherford, 2015; 
Paton & Mordaunt, 2004). Secondly, public sector organisations can be impeded if they 
pursue radical actions that lack political legitimacy or prompt a political challenge (Beeri, 
2012; Beeri, 2012; Boyne, 2004; Boyne & Meier, 2009b). Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, Boyne (2006, p. 382) argues that “repositioning is likely to consist of a narrower 
set of strategies in the public than the private sector and may have a correspondingly smaller 
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impact on the turnaround.”  In an NGB context, this means that repositioning might bring 
improvements in organisational performance, but that they may still be insufficient to re-
engage with World Class Programmes needed to secure funding under a ‘No Compromise’ 
policy. 
New public management: a present restriction 
NGBs within the UK have benefited from a decentralised approach to government 
intervention within sport that gives them greater autonomy of action. While this approach has 
resulted in increased funding for some NGBs, it has also forced them to become results 
orientated (efficiency, effectiveness, service quality) akin to market-based approaches to 
service delivery. This tendency is theorised in Hood’s (1995) concept of New Public 
Management as a more business-like management driven style that contrasts with the 
collaborative ethic of New Public Governance (Osborne, 2006). 
UK Sport can be seen as a driver of NPM because of its target-driven approach to 
funding and emphasis on accountability for results. NGBs are challenged to demonstrate 
‘good management practices’ through the winning of Olympic medals (Coalter, 2007; 
Holmes & Shand, 1995; Hood, 1991), however, this ‘simplified’ measure of performance 
attracts criticism because NGBs have complex objectives, intricate accountabilities and lack 
the degrees of freedom that are required for NPM to succeed (Mongkol, 2011; Singh, 2003).  
The drive for continual organisational improvement through the adoption of ‘good’ 
managerial practices ignores one of the most important constraints facing an NGB during 
turnaround. If an NGB has responsibility for its entire sports development pathway, from 
grassroots to elite athletes, it is extremely challenging to reconcile the aims and objectives of 
Sport England and UK Sport at opposite ends of the sports development continuum. Funding 
regimes ring-fence money to prevent cross-funding (Green & Houlihan, 2006; Hylton, 2013; 
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McDonald, 2011), indeed this has sometimes resulted in a separate legal entity (GB) being 
created to ensure funding is distributed directly to elite programmes/athletes rather than being 
allocated to grassroots initiatives (Green & Houlihan, 2005). Ring fencing of funds received 
from Sport England and UK Sport promotes a resource and routine rigidity, which constrains 
NGBs as it is understood that flexibility in resource allocation is vital to a successful 
turnaround (Boyne, 2006; Boyne et al., 2009). More generally the narrow focus on Olympic 
success restricts strategic or operational flexibility (Grix, 2009; Spear, 2004).  
Methodology 
This study uses case studies to pinpoint issues that affect NGBs implementing 
turnaround strategies (Yin, 2009). Simons (2009, p. 56) supports this approach as she argues 
that case studies can provide a “research design that takes as its subject a few selected 
examples of a social entity.” Whilst the rationale case studies can be made on the basis that 
examining one single entity can result in gaining a deeper understanding of a phenomenon, 
published work on turnaround has been limited by a lack of comparative case study work. We 
see value in theorising about consistencies and differences across NGBs using a more 
analytical form of qualitative inquiry (Darabi & Clark, 2012; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Glaser, 
1965). 
To enhance the credibility and transferability of the findings, a multiple case study 
approach was adopted (Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2009). Using multiple case studies enables 
comparisons to be made across sports that have suffered extreme reductions in funding. 
Multiple actors in multiple settings were interviewed on multiple occasions to check and 
recheck the transferability of the findings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Simons, 2009; Yin, 
2009) 
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Sampling was purposive, based on the potential in each case study to supply specialist 
knowledge relevant to the research question (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). By 
utilising the critical case approach, we selected ‘decisive’ cases where NGBs had received the 
most severe funding reductions. Our results, therefore, contribute to a richer understanding of 
context because “the weight of evidence produced in studying critical cases” enabled us to 
test the transferability of findings between cases (Patton, 1999, pp. 174-175).  
Cases were selected only if they had received a reduction in funding from UK Sport 
during the allocations for the Rio de Janerio Olympic funding cycle (2013 - 2017). Secondly, 
sports were removed from consideration where there was little threat to organisational 
survival. This resulted in a final selection of three NGBs that experienced cuts sufficient to 
endanger survival (90-100% for elite programmes) who agreed to provide extended research 
access. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted using a range of open-ended 
questions on retrenchment, reorganisation, and repositioning to assess stakeholders’ 
commitment and resistance to each turnaround effort (Saunders et al., 2012). They were 
designed to elicit stakeholder’s experiences using a ‘nested’ approach with people at multiple 
levels in each case (Thomas, 2011).  
Individuals with similar role characteristics were selected. This enabled an 
exploration of each informant’s contribution to, and experience of, the turnaround effort 
based on their role (Creswell, 2015; Farquhar, 2012). Three individuals were chosen based on 
their involvement in an elite programmes and turnaround effort. Firstly, the Chief Executive 
Officer/President to understand how leadership roles changed within the organisation and 
their importance to the turnaround process (Kanter, 2003; Murphy, 2006; Pretorius & 
Holtzhauzen, 2008). Secondly, elite athletes directly affected by turnaround decisions were 
selected to assess whether their funding was reduced, cutback or cancelled entirely. Lastly, 
performance managers/head coaches were interviewed to assess how new strategic and 
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operational plans were drawn up after the funding reductions. The process was iterative. 
Findings gathered from one research informant fed into the next interview (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In all the cases, this interview schedule was replicated. As Farquhar (2012) argues, 
when examining multiple cases the informants should share the same characteristics across 
all cases. The athletes and the CEOs were interviewed three times over the course of the 
study. The first interview occurred immediately after the implementation of the funding cuts. 
In the case of performance managers, only one interview was possible due to issues of access. 
Finally, two representatives from UK Sport (a governance manager and performance 
director) were interviewed to provide a funder perspective on funding decisions.  
All interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. Respondents were 
anonymised to assure them of confidentiality. Table 1 provides a summary of the interviews 
and cases within the study.  
Insert Table 1 here  
The primary themes of retrenchment, reorganisation, repositioning were used to guide 
coding of the data. This promoted the identification of sub-themes and cross-case patterns. 
The goal of coding was to examine and locate intra-organisational themes - similarities or 
differences - in turnaround efforts (Farquhar, 2012; Simons, 2009; Yin, 2009) to  flesh out 
Boyne’s framework by inductively analysing the interview transcripts and constantly 
comparing findings to establish and refine sub-themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2015). Coding and thematic analysis was undertaken with NVivo10 (Bazeley & 
Jackson, 2013). 
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Results and discussion 
To study how NGBs turnaround so they can meet future performance targets, we 
organised findings using the concepts of retrenchment, reorganisation and repositioning. We 
identify similarities and differences across cases, and between the findings and literature.  
Retrenchment 
Reducing the size and scope of the sport 
A clear finding - apparent across all NGBs - was the severity and immediacy of the 
funding reductions. In all cases, this led them into a reactive and sustained period of 
retrenchment. A consistent theme from the research was that CEOs were not expecting to 
receive such drastic reductions, with the CEO of NGB 3 stating it was a “huge, huge shock 
[…] there had never been the slightest hint that sports would receive no funding after 2012.”  
NGBs 2 and 3 had to immediately cancel their Olympic programmes, while NGB1 had to cut 
nearly all its financial support for elite athletes. Such unplanned and hurriedly communicated 
responses, particularly in the cases of NGB2 and 3, had significant impacts upon their 
relationships with athletes. The CEO of NGB 3 stated: 
We’ve lost them. They’ll leave the sport, and they’ll go off and do other 
things. They’re totally disillusioned with sport and the agencies.  (CEO, NGB 
3) 
 
A distinct theme emerging from interviews was that the funding reductions were 
debilitating NGBs by triggering counterproductive responses which negated years of 
planning and careful stakeholder development. For example, a retrenchment measure by 
NGBs 2 and 3 (returning management of elite programmes to home nation governing bodies) 
was a short term fix, borne out of a perceived financial requirement and not a strategic 
17 
 
decision to decentralise. Placing the responsibility for the elite sport with a home nation (e.g. 
England) was an attempt to reduce the size and scope of the NGB operating across GB. This 
impact of this abandonment was striking:  
There was no programme [so] there was no team. There was no real will or 
inclination to, you know, in other words, no one was responsible. The money 
had run out, nobody is employed anymore, you know the lights were turned 
off, the door was locked and that was it. (CEO, NGB 3) 
 
You had assistant coaches who were UK based - those staff immediately left. 
All of a sudden you couldn’t have a national squad anymore because you 
didn’t have any coaches; you had no one to lead it. (Performance manager, 
NGB 2) 
 
Successfully managing retrenchment requires coordination and cooperation between 
organisations. However, the suddenness of retrenchment – as shown above - created barriers 
to the future coordination and cooperation of national NGBs. In the context of elite sport, the 
GB bodies no longer controlled communication and collaboration between the home nation 
NGB and the GB governing bodies (Peters, Pierre, & Randma-Liiv, 2011). As Lodge & Hood 
(2012) comment, even if two organisations have intertwined goals, aims, and objectives, their 
legal separation results in them focussing on their own performance during times of 
uncertainty. 
Such retrenchment actions represents a form of protectionism that impacted on the 
demographics of participants. Moreover, home nation NGBs sought to retain resources. For 
example: 
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I don’t know if they [GB NGB and home nation NGBs] communicated 
between themselves in terms of really understanding the consequences of 
removing funding from senior programmes. However, that part of the 
pyramid is now completely blank and that has implications. (Performance 
manager, NGB 3) 
 
There was no support from the home nations. They felt they didn't have to 
commit anything financial because they had no responsibility towards the 
programme, so they didn't really put any support behind the team which 
seemed ridiculous. (Athlete, NGB 3) 
 
An Interviewee (Athlete, NGB 3) reported that athletes felt abandoned as the home 
nation did not “have a single coin to put towards an [Olympic] team.”  As Lodge and Hood 
(2012) argue, retrenchment actions can exacerbate stakeholder divisions. Organisations 
become less likely to engage in future proofing reforms. Instead, they become preoccupied 
with protecting their own resources and strategic priorities (Cayer, 1986).  
Rethinking elite performance pathways 
NGB 1, in contrast, was in a more fortuitous position because athletes had a 
professional outlet. Retrenchment here involved placing the financial burden upon athletes 
using a ‘user pays model’ of delivery (Mano, 2010). Instead of devolving to national NGBs, 
they maintained an elite performance pathway in which the relationships with ‘elite athletes’ 
could continue to be cultivated under new conditions. Despite the apparent appeal of this 
approach, it was not likely to be sustainable in the long-term:   
People see the positive direction of travel and therefore are prepared to 
support where we’re trying to get to. But we’re gonna need either corporate 
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money, commercial money or some public funding to get them to start 
supporting it - support a program. It won’t be sustainable [in its current form] 
for long. (CEO, NGB 1) 
 
 [The national NGB is] just going to fund worlds and Europeans now, but any 
other international open we have to pay […] you have to self-fund yourself. 
(Athlete, NGB 1) 
 
Retrenchment was made possible by the power relationship the NGB has with the 
athletes (Piggin, 2012). The NGB controlled access to competitions and training camps and 
was less dependent on the elite athletes than they were upon the NGB. Hence, the athletes 
were limited in their ability to challenge this retrenchment action (Chalip, 1996; Piggin, 
Jackson, & Lewis, 2009). Athletes had to pay upwards of £1,500 for training camps and 
specialist coaching and faced further increases that triggered dilemmas over whether to pay 
the increased costs or leave the sport (Sutton, Stoll, & Ditton, 2001). 
For NGBs 2 and 3, the user pays model was not feasible. Furthermore, their GB 
players were unwilling to play for England due to perceptions that their programme lacked 
professionalism. It is possible for athletes to reach a decision not to support their sport 
(Trahms et al., 2013). In this study, athletes stated this clearly: 
There just is no GB activity. So when they hit 18/19 they have to make that 
decision to take that step aboard, and progress their career. There are no 
Olympic games to aim for, there is no European Championships to play for 
which we can only enter with funding. Why would they sacrifice their 
university education for a career when it is clearly just not worth it? (Athlete, 
NGB 2)  
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The further we move away from that Olympic team we are pretty much going 
to have start all over again, and most of the guys are not going to want to do 
it anymore. (Athlete, NGB 3) 
 
The predicament faced was that NGBs could only deliver elite programmes as 
volunteer/amateur programmes whereas athletes would only commit to them if they 
preserved professional integrity.  
Inflexibility inhibits retrenchment 
New Public Management (NPM) pervades NGBs retrenchment decisions as they seek 
to appease funding agencies and engage in evidence-based activities (Coalter, 2007; Hood, 
1991; Hood, 1994). Nevertheless, attempts to steer NGBs toward ‘business like’ delivery of 
sport pathways is constrained by funding mechanisms with both executives and athletes 
reporting that the flexibility of NGBs to reallocate resources during retrenchment was 
restricted (Sanchez, 1995; Shimizu & Hitt, 2004): 
You don’t take decisions like businesses. You take decisions based on where 
and how money is ring fenced, particularly if it's Exchequer money. (CEO, 
NGB 1) 
 
The money is absolutely ring-fenced. The sport is now left with 99 percent of 
their funding coming in from Sport England ring that is completely fenced 
for grass roots. So if they could, they would, but they can’t. (Athlete, NGB 3) 
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Kazozcu (2011) explains that such constraints negatively impact on the organisation's 
ability to turnaround, a view supported by many interviewees who reported that financial 
inflexibility heavily impeded retrenchment actions. Consequently, NGBs undertook 
‘pragmatic’ retrenchment activities to secure short-term financial stability. Yet crucially, as 
noted by Rasheed (2005) and Ochieno (2013), these decisions can be ineffective and lacking 
the strategic vision to address sources of organisational decline. Ochieno contends that 
retrenchment measures can diminish organisational capability by pursuing efficiency without 
considerations of effectiveness. This was not because of the funding cuts themselves but 
institutional obstacles that paralysed the NGBs’ ability to respond innovatively.  
 We found that short-termism and impediments to innovate prolonged the 
retrenchment phase and contributed to continued decline (Bozeman, 2010; Rasheed, 2005; 
Thibault & Babiak, 2005). The severity and immediacy of funding cuts themselves 
perpetuated underperformance leading to a continuing decline within elite sports pathways. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Reorganisation 
Resource dependence and funding rigidities 
The NGBs engaged in various forms of reorganisation. However, due to their resource 
dependence on external agencies, they were constrained in their ability to change core 
features and purpose due to a high level of publicness (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Pandey, 
2010). The NGBs face multiple and varying degrees of resource rigidity that force them into 
specific, restrictive task environments within which they operate.  
We’re about seventy-five per cent reliant on public funding and I’ve gotta get 
that down. The problem is I’ve only got two other sources to go to really, the 
22 
 
membership and there’s only so far you can push the membership and 
commercial, but that’s a challenge. (CEO, NGB 1) 
 
This resource rigidity (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Noda & Bower, 1996) was 
evidenced in NGB 3 where the overriding approach was the “day-to-day, week-to-week 
tasks, the minutia of running the sport” rather than any long-term strategic development 
(Athlete, NGB 3). This is also illustrated by the cases of NGB 2 and NGB 3 where actors felt 
impelled - post funding cuts - to prioritise activities for Sport England. We found that the 
funding mechanism created a period of inertia, delaying the NGBs efforts to the strategic 
reorganisation of elite pathways. 
I think there is the will [to support us], they just don’t have the resource to do 
it and because their funding comes in Sport England for specific projects, 
specific targeted areas, it is not like saying here you go here is a million quid, 
no they run targets, KPIs, outcomes, measurable and all of the stuff that goes 
through management speak these days. (CEO, NGB 3) 
 
The machine-like logic of funding from UK Sport induced NGBs to resourcing the 
status quo rather than making progressive investments in longer-term change that promoted 
structural changes leading to performance improvement (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). 
One consequence of the cuts for elite athletes was explained by the CEO: 
I just hope we haven’t lost them, but I fear we’ve lost far more than I would 
like. If there’s nothing for them to target or to aspire to… I have 28 [athletes], 
men and women who no longer have anything to aspire to... We have gone 
back 25 years. We’ve gone backwards. (CEO, NGB 3) 
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The CEO explained that a UK Sport’s grant places “certain conditions on you that if you 
don’t meet they will either seek to recover or … stop funding” (CEO, NGB 3). It requires 
specialized internal organisational processes, structures and systems to be in place to meet 
these conditions (Gilbert, 2005), a series of changes that – under different circumstances – 
could be incrementally and adaptively introduced in a “self-reinforcing and path-dependent 
manner” (Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Karnøe, 2010, p. 761). The suddenness of the cuts meant 
that NGB 2 and NGB 3 could not adapt quickly to a regime of discontinuous change (Meyer, 
Brooks, & Goes, 1990; Nadler, 1995). Given the self-enforcing nature of ‘routines,’ sudden 
change becomes highly challenging for NGBs as they are strongly embedded within an 
existing task-driven environment and susceptible to the ‘competency trap’. Their high degree 
of specialism inhibits their ability to exploit new opportunities (Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
Levitt & March, 1988). The paradoxical challenge of working within these constraints was 
ably articulated by one of the CEOs: 
I’m not saying everything they do is right, I’m not saying all their models are 
right, I’m not saying the way they change their ideas about where to put 
money left, right and centre is right, but the reality is that they fund us about 
80% of our income and none of us would have jobs if it wasn’t for them, so 
we need to work out how we work with them. (CEO, NGB 1) 
 
Despite these challenges, we did find evidence of systematic attempts to reorganise in 
order to build sustainable pathways for the future. These were often rooted in a complete 
rethink of how to connect junior sports to future pathways that lead to success at senior level: 
Well, on the first one I’ve always said never waste a crisis. Massive problems 
can force you to relook and come up with something more innovative. That’s 
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the sort of spirit that we’re going forward on. “Let’s not sit around moping 
about it.” (CEO, NGB 1) 
 
We want to build a sustainable model of player development, so we are going 
to start off by coaching u8’s and then it up year on year. So we have an u8’s 
and build up to u10’s, and then start another u8’s. (Athlete, NGB 2) 
 
Retaining organisational memory 
In NGB 2 and 3, the cancellation of funding for elite pathways led to many athletes 
retiring or leaving the sport due to role ambiguity, conflict and the frustration of no longer 
being a ‘professional’ athlete (Robbins & Judge, 2011; Slack & Hinings, 1992). This has 
repercussions. There is a huge loss of organisational memory because these athletes have 
“knowledge of the sport in terms of the talent pathway.... far greater than anyone [else] in the 
sport [such as coaches, administrators, volunteers]” (Performance Manager, NGB 2). To 
counter this loss, some incentives were created for key figures to remain, a paid role that gave 
clarity in terms of shaping the expectations of athletes. 
Alternatively, NGB 3 - for the same reason - created voluntary roles. However, due to 
resource deficiencies, uneven and unreasonable workload expectations placed on athletes still 
led to their departure because they were unable to “dedicate the time it takes to do the role 
properly in a voluntary position” (Athlete, NGB 3). Policies to retain experienced athletes in 
all NGBs were also affected by a demand for high levels of educational attainment (Cosh & 
Tully, 2014). From a turnaround perspective, NGBs have to create structured educational 
opportunities to deliver a new elite level sports programme (Cosh & Tully, 2014). The 
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Athlete in NGB 1 highlights the instrumental view of individuals within a new high-
performance sport regime: 
I was […] lucky because I made a decision to stay at university and complete 
my studies. However, if I decided to pack it all tomorrow, there would be no 
support, no counselling. I think my transition out of the sport would a 
nightmare. They would basically dump me and move onto the next athlete. I 
know they call sport the school of hard knocks but there is really no 
compassion. It’s all about winning medals and there is nothing else - 
particularly when it comes to the athletes. (Athlete, NGB 1) 
Insert Table 3 here 
Repositioning 
Changing how the sport is viewed 
 
We had some funding right up to the commonwealths. I think they were 
determined to do well to prove their credibility, especially after all the 
criticism from UK Sport. It’s all filtered down and they have sorted the 
association out really and rebranded it. (Athlete, NGB 1) 
 
One notable attempt at repositioning was rebranding of the entire sport – NGB 1. 
Rebranding can signal to both internal and external stakeholders that the organisation has 
changed (Merrilees & Miller, 2008; Stuart & Muzellec, 2004). The CEO argued that a name 
change (to fall into line with other NGBs) was a ‘no brainer’. Muzellec & Lambkin (2006) 
identify risks from rebranding: loss of associated values; an erosion of brand equity. In this 
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case, the renaming acted as a stimulus for the NGB to shape a new culture that showed 
responsiveness to a market. 
 Clearly, the CEO of NGB 1 accepted the logics of marketization implicit in NPM. He 
also felt that the old logo was out of step with other NGBs and was so obscure that it “could 
be selling paint.” In this case, the claim made was that funding agencies had a perception of 
the old NGB as “dysfunctional” so it was necessary to convince others that rebranding 
communicated a new organisation purpose in order to rebuild trust and legitimacy (Stride, 
2006): 
The European associations all have the same logo, one that links their athletes 
to the sport rather that the association. We could do something more dynamic 
... The [new] logo emphasises movement and precision and timing and 
explosion …. it gives you a nice device that you can put through marketing 
materials. (CEO, NGB 1) 
 
However, there was limited consultation with members / volunteers during the 
rebranding. Given research that turnaround depends on members’ and volunteers’ motivation, 
maintaining their commitment is likely to enhance chances of long-term survival (Merrilees, 
2005; Plewa, Lu, & Veale, 2011). In this case, there is a risk that stakeholders’ commitment 
may decline, particularly if they retain an emotional attachment to the old brand (Daly & 
Moloney, 2004). NGB 1 was hampered by a lack of financial resource to properly involve 
internal stakeholders in the rebranding (Boyne, 2004; Boyne & Meier, 2009a; Pretorius, 
2008; Walshe et al., 2004). 
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Increasing resources  
So we are looking at different ways of how we can generate additional 
income and commercial sponsorship is absolutely vital... (Performance 
Manager, NGB 3) 
 
A key repositioning strategy employed by all NGBs was a concerted attempt to 
leverage additional money from members (Beeri, 2009; Boyne, 2004; Hofer, 1980). These 
NGBs sought to change their relationship so they could support their users through the 
creation of buyer and seller relationships and market mechanisms (Brennan, Cass, 
Himmelweit, & Szebehely, 2012). NGBs turned to internal stakeholders to generate 
additional income, For example, coaches were asked to pay to update their qualifications, 
athletes were asked to pay for training camps, and clubs were charged for registering players. 
This inward-looking marketization was prompted by the inability of the NGBs to develop 
other commercial activities or attract sponsors. However, this change was also prompted by 
the government (through Sport England and UK Sport) through pressures on the NGBs to 
adopt a full range of private sector management practices linked to ‘efficiency’ (Bruce & 
Chew, 2011; Houlihan, 2002; Houlihan & Green, 2009). 
We have to charge England Youth Squad level and its fifteen hundred quid. 
We will talk to parents and where we think there are issues we will try and 
find a way around it. People are understanding if they really want to buy into 
it or not. (CEO, NGB 1) 
 
A consequence of these actions to attract internal revenue was the replacement of an 
‘association logic’ with that of a ‘consumer logic’ (Eikenberry, 2009; Houlihan, 2002; 
Houlihan & Green, 2009; Ibsen & Seippel, 2010). Several of the CEOs discussed the 
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movement from the concept of a member organisation to one inhabited by consumers, with 
competition between NGBs being a primary driver of change. Recognising increased direct 
competition for the attention of sport participants, to retain existing members, attract new 
ones and a need to promote and deliver service quality (Brennan et al., 2012; Nichols et al., 
2005). The CEO of NGB 2 explained this evolving approach: 
It’s about changing mindsets within governing bodies and thinking about the 
people that play their sport less as players, members or participants but more 
as customers. People that are making a valued decision on do I invest my 
time and my money in playing [sport] or do I go to the cinema? (CEO, NGB 
2) 
  
We see this advancement of NPM into NGBs, representing a switch to a marketised 
approach to sports programme delivery. Yet this is problematic, for example, while 
“businesses manipulate customers, pay more attention to some than to others, and their aim is 
proﬁt” (Aberbach & Christensen, 2005, p. 243), NGBs have democratic accountabilities 
through their legal roots as associations. Responsibilities such as making provisions for grass 
roots and elite level support, delivering services to clubs as well as achieving outcomes for 
funding agencies. The placing of emphasis on the satisfaction of individual desires rather than 
the achievement of collective goals represents a switch away from the mutual goals upon 
which sports are built. NPM thus drives individualisation in service delivery on the basis of a 
flawed logic that market-based systems solve policy challenges (Hood, 1991; Lapsley, 2009; 
Osborne, 2006). There are practical problems of adopting an NPM driven service delivery 
model grounded around the marketization of sports delivery,  summarised  by Aberbach & 
Christensen (2005, p. 243) who state: 
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Should public sector administrators be held accountable for satisfying 
customer preferences in a way that they are not satisﬁed in the private sector 
where price, and not public opinion, dominates? In addition, should those 
with the most resources or the loudest voices (the best organised) get more 
than others? That is not a major moral problem in a pure market, but it is (or 
ought to be) in a democratic polity.  
 
Whilst there may be a short-term willingness from those already in elite sports 
development to pay these fees, over the long-term these barriers may actively talented 
participants from joining the sport (Bailey, 2007) leading to a spiral of decline, lowering 
standard in elite sports accompanied by a decrease in the number of people playing at a 
grassroots level. If sports feel constrained to charge for services, and view their members as 
consumers, they will exclude those who cannot afford to play (Bloyce & Smith, 2010). So, 
rather than being an instrument that promotes social inclusion and mutual association, NGBs 
act as agents of social exclusion by creating economic barriers for those without the ability to 
pay (Holt, 2007; Hylton, 2013). 
Creation of new strategic alliances and partnerships  
Evidence of innovation was apparent through engagement in horizontal and vertical 
integration to deliver sports programmes through strategic alliances with other NGBs (Clegg, 
2011; David, 2013; Johnson, Whittington, Scholes, Angwin, & Regner, 2014). NGBs 
collaborated with various athletes along the sports development continuum to deliver training 
opportunities (David, 2013; Johnson et al., 2014; Slack & Parent, 2006). For example, NGB 3 
engaged in this, but also NGB 2 who began to deliver training sessions collaboratively with 
another fully professionalised sport, creating transition opportunities for athletes between the 
sports – including switching sports when each was in and out of season (David, 2013; 
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Trenberth & Hassan, 2012). An elite athlete could transition out of one sport into another, 
advance through the sports development continuum, and find a new pathway to podium level.  
We get some rugby players, and we get football players that don’t like their 
sports anymore. We get everyone and they play [our sport] because it’s fun. 
It’s not necessarily because they see a future in the sport straight away. That 
is what we have done is try and show them there is potential to progress. 
(Performance Management, NGB 2) 
 
From a turnaround perspective, this repositioning approach offers considerable 
benefits to both NGBs and athletes. It is low on resource requirements, gains transition 
benefits for the athlete, and helps the smaller NGB to learn from a larger NGB. The funding 
systems operated by Sport England and UK Sport act to promote such collaborations as it 
rewards sports who increase participation levels as well as those that achieve medal winning 
performances, even if there is not conscious encouragement of a collegiate system to sport 
delivery (Goodwin & Grix, 2011; Grix & Phillpots, 2011). In the case of NGB 3, 
collaborations could potentially result in its relocation, along with another NGB, to a new 
purpose built facility. By cooperating, NGBs find opportunities to combine their internal 
strengths and minimise internal weaknesses (Coule, 2008; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Robert, 
Marques, & Le Roy, 2009). Perhaps, most importantly, collaboration allows two NGBs to 
spread risk at a time of financial constraint (Clegg, 2011; Pitt & Koufopoulos, 2012). This 
form of strategic alliance allows ‘co-specialisation’ between two NGBs where staff 
competences and capabilities are matched.  
Insert Table 4 here 
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Conclusion 
This paper has identified and examined a gap in the literature pertaining to the 
management and governance of high performance sport, namely turnaround management in 
NGBs. Turnaround is a rife topic given the well-established implications of the ‘No 
Compromise’ funding framework (Green & Houlihan, 2005; Green & Houlihan, 2006). The 
topic of turnaround is therefore of particular importance, and this shows no sign of abating. 
There has been a recent intensification of the NPM rhetoric of UK Sport, DCMS, and also 
Sport England as they seek to further reinforce continual performance improvement and the 
achievement of specified targets (ComRes, 2015; DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2015; HM 
Government, 2015; Sport England, 2016; UK Sport, 2015b; UK Sport, 2015c). It is not the 
argument, or a finding, of this research that UK Sport policy leads to organisational decline, 
rather it is an underlying consequence of the ‘No Compromise’ framework that it repetitively 
inflicts turnaround situations. Furthermore the challenge, for NGBs, of responding to required 
turnaround exacerbated by a policy environment which places considerable limitations and 
restrictions upon the operations of NGBs. 
A seminal finding of this paper is that the severity and immediacy of the funding cuts 
create flux, triggering a short termism that is inconsistent with within the future success of the 
NGB. Decision-making, among the case organisations, was overwhelmingly at an operational 
level, disconnected from a more strategic view of the optimum long-term direction of the 
organisation (Francis & Desai, 2005). A critical issue is that NGBs become impelled toward a 
short-range  focus on performance management because of the resource-dependent 
relationship it shares with UK Sport and the need to demonstrate its ability to achieve future 
targets (Collins & Cruickshank, 2012; Green, 2006; Jimenez, 2013; UK Sport, 2006). 
Such turnaround approaches, emerging from perceived short term necessities, are 
inconsistent with a more stakeholder centered view and an approach which seeks to safeguard 
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and enhance future stakeholders relations. Consequently years of considered relationship 
building is destabilized and this is visible, from the findings of our research, in many ways 
and is in direct opposition to the prevailing sentiment and importance of partnerships in high 
performance sport management. Although there are notable counter flows to this prevailing 
picture, such as the collaboration between NGBs, the overall narrative is of NGBs pursuing 
reactive measures that could be detrimental to a successful turnaround and the expedient 
achievement of medium to longer term performance targets.  
NGBs in the UK have excessive over-reliance on singular funding streams which by 
their very nature, be unpredictable, results in their business model being exposed to excessive 
inherent risk. An obvious management and research implication of this research is to 
question, not only how NGBs can respond in a turnaround situation but also, and more 
fundamentally, to consider how this risk can be ably mitigated. The evidence of this in-depth 
study, of three such NGBs, is that they do not sufficiently factor this risk into their strategy 
development. Consequently when the fragility of their funding is realised the organisation 
spirals into a state a short term flux rather than reverting to considered long term approach; a 
premeditated ‘Plan B’. 
It is noteworthy that at times of turnaround these strategic organisations become too 
preoccupied with the here and now. This incongruity is explained in this paper as an outcome 
of the climate dictated by UK Sports ‘No Compromise’ framework that not only makes 
‘turnaround’ an inherent feature of NGB management, but also significantly constrains the 
range of responses. Clearly the governance and management of the high performance sports 
organisations  must embark upon approaches to safeguard their organisations by ensuring 
they prudently anticipate alternate futures and in so doing evolve a range of favourable 
strategic options. If we accept that NGBs are exposed to excessive risk, and turnaround is 
always ‘just around the corner’, perhaps the ‘No Comprise’ framework, itself, should be 
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evolved to require strategic planning for alternate futures. The varied paths of retrenchment, 
reorganisation, and repositioning offer varied favourable and less favourable paths but 
perhaps more sober consideration of these paths could be achieved through 
(pre)retrenchment, (pre)reorganisation, (pre)repositioning. Turnaround strategies should be 
oriented to future proofing NGBs the evidence of this paper is the opposite. 
Although this paper makes a timely contribution to the literature as a longitudinal 
study, comparing and contrasting three NGBs, it has limitations and certainly there is merit in 
analysing the journey over a longer period of time to more closely track the future 
impications of the decisions taken. Studies should examine cases through an entire Olympic 
funding cycle, with multiple contact points, so as to allow the individual nuances from each 
case study to become more distinct through an inclusive examination of respondents 
involved. Future research could adopt a mixed methods approach perhaps making use of the 
typologies of themes identified in the results tables.  
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